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As medical science develops, new drugs, devices and treatments are con-
stantly being created for the use of the medical profession. Similarly, new
knowledge about disease and the functions of the human body is constantly
being discovered and disseminated. This condition of constant change cre-
ates an important practical question that the medical practitioner must an-
swer: when, under theories of malpractice and informed consent, does a
physician have a duty to inform a patient of a newly developed or controver-
sial alternative therapy, different from the therapy the physician recom-
mends for the patient? A satisfactory answer to this question will require an
approach somewhat different from that used in the usual situation involving
the absence of informed consent to a medical procedure. This article will
propose that although a physician may properly be required to inform a
patient of all medically acceptable alternative treatments, even if the applica-
tion of a professional standard of care would not require such disclosure, the
use of a professional standard is nevertheless essential to establish what
treatments are medically acceptable.
II. MALPRACTICE AND INFORMED CONSENT
In analyzing the duty to inform patients of new medical treatments, it is
important to distinguish between the theories underlying causes of action for
malpractice and for failure to obtain informed consent to medical treatment.
A claim for malpractice is made out when the patient is harmed as a result of
a physician's failure to render care in accordance with that which would
have been rendered by other physicians practicing in the community.1 This
standard is a "professional" one in that the physician's conduct is measured
in relation to what would have been considered proper by other professionals
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University School of Law, 1989; Law Clerk to the Hon. John MacKenzie, United States Dis-
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1. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 205 (1981).
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in the field, and not by an objective standard of reasonableness. Thus, in
evaluating whether a physician should have recommended or used a newly
developed medical treatment, this professional standard of malpractice will
be applied. There can, of course, be complications with this rule. For exam-
ple, there may be disputes about whether the relevant community consists of
local practitioners or members of a specialty on a national basis.2 It may
also be that a particular standard of practice will be considered so outra-
geous or deficient that a court may disregard the professional standard and
find the practice to be negligent as a matter of law. Nevertheless, the basic
standard of behavior for the rendering of medical treatment is established by
the professional community, and not by external authority.
There is a sharp division under state law, on the other hand, as to the
elements of a cause of action for failure to obtain informed consent to a
medical treatment or procedure. Older cases based the duty to obtain in-
formed consent on the idea that an unconsented touching was actionable
battery,4 although this has now generally been recognized as an archaic way
of thinking about the issues involved, and the focus has shifted to the pa-
tient's rights of self-determination. The cause of action is also often stated in
terms of negligence rather than battery. For example, Minnesota courts
have
recognized a cause of action for medical malpractice due to negli-
gent nondisclosure of a significant risk of treatment or alternative
treatment plan. . . . To make out such a claim, a plaintiff must
establish a duty on the pait of the physician to know of a risk or
alternate treatment program. He must also show a duty to disclose
the risk or alternate treatment plan by evidence establishing that a
reasonable person in what the physician knows or should have
known to be the patient's position would likely attach significance
to that risk or alternative in formulating his decision to consent to
treatment. He further must show breach of that duty, causation,
and damage.5
Modern cases take one of two approaches to the duty to obtain informed
2. In Logan v. Greenwich Hospital Association, 191 Conn. 282, 465 A.2d 294 (1983),
the court abandoned the limitation of the physician's standard of conduct to physicians prac-
ticing in the state in favor of a national standard, since medical literature is equally available to
all physicians.
3. Thus, where a glaucoma test was simple, inexpensive, reliable and risk-free, it was
negligence for an opthamologist to fail to administer the test to persons under the age of 40,
even though it was not routinely administered to such persons by others in the profession.
Gates v., Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979). See also 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians,
Surgeons, and Other Healers § 211 (1981).
4. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 197 (1981).
5. Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn. 1980) (footnote omitted).
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consent. In certain states, a professional standard is applied here as well. In
other words, a physician has a duty to inform his or her patients of the same
risks of, and alternatives to, the proposed medical treatment as would other
physicians practicing in the community. In essence, this form of the cause of
action is a subset of malpractice. Thus, in Ziegert v. South Chicago Commu-
nity Hospital,6 the court applied a "reasonable medical practitioner" stan-
dard of informed consent, and held that there must be expert medical
testimony of the necessity to inform patients of possible alternatives.7 Thus,
although the claim of failure to obtain informed consent may be treated as a
cause of action separate from malpractice, all of the defendant doctor's be-
havior with regard to the patient will be measured by the same standard,
that of adherence to the level of care given by other practitioners in the
relevant community.
On the other hand, many states apply a "lay" standard of informed con-
sent, requiring the physician to inform the patient of all the information a
reasonable patient would wish to know in making an informed decision as to
whether to undergo the proposed therapy. This approach protects the pa-
tient's right of personal autonomy and control of his or her body, wholly
apart from the physician's duty not to commit malpractice. Indeed, under
either approach to informed consent, the treatment proposed by the physi-
cian may be entirely proper and may even be properly rendered, but still
may result in liability if consent was inadequate. The difference is that with
the lay standard, different standards of behavior are used to measure the
duty not to commit malpractice and the duty to obtain informed consent.
A typical formulation of the lay or "prudent patient" standard of in-
formed consent is as follows:
In Pennsylvania, a physician is liable to his or her patient if (1) the
physician fails to disclose any risk in the recommended treatment,
or the existence of any alternative method of treatment, that a rea-
sonable person would deem material in deciding whether to un-
dergo the recommended treatment; (2) the patient would have
foregone the recommended treatment had he or she known of the
undisclosed information; and (3) as a result of the recommended
treatment, the patient actually suffers an injury the risk of which
was undisclosed, or the patient actually suffers an injury that
would not have occurred had the patient opted for one of the un-
6. 99 Il. App. 3d 83, 425 N.E.2d 450 (1981).
7. Id. at 92-93, 425 N.E.2d at 458-59. See also Guebard v. Jabaay, 117 II. App. 3d 1,
12-13, 452 N.E.2d 751, 759-60 (1983) (where doctor did not disclose alternative treatment
which plaintiff's expert testified was preferable, jury question was created as to whether failure
to inform was proximate cause of plaintiff's harm).
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disclosed methods of treatment.8
While some courts hold that the patient must prove subjectively that "full
disclosure of the material risk or alternative would have altered her decision
to consent to treatment,"9 others apply an objective test, requiring a showing
that a reasonable person would have made a different choice if informed of
the risk or alternative.1" In practice, of course, it is difficult to refute an
injured plaintiff's claim that he or she would have chosen a different course
of treatment if fully informed. Accordingly, the subjective test is likely to
benefit plaintiffs, while the reasonable patient test is likely to benefit
defendants.
It is also worth noting that the injury required under an informed consent
claim is not necessarily an injury resulting from negligent or improper medi-
cal treatment. As will be described more fully infra, the injury may even be
a fully expected outcome of the recommended medical treatment. The cru-
cial factor is that it would have been avoided if the plaintiff had chosen an
undisclosed alternative treatment.
Both the professional and lay standards of informed consent are part of
the general evolution of attitudes about the relationship between the medical
profession and medical patients, including the growing belief that patients
are entitled to more information about their health, as well as a real and
informed role in decisions about their medical treatment. As general levels
of education and public awareness of health issues have increased, patients
have become dissatisfied with the paternalism of much traditional medical
practice and have sought more power for themselves in the relationship.
This change in attitude finds expression in the law of informed consent.
III. DUTY TO INFORM OF ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS
Under either the professional or lay approach to informed consent, the
physician has the duty to inform the patient of appropriate alternative treat-
8. Neal v. Lu, 365 Pa. Super. 464, 478, 530 A.2d 103, 111 (1987) (citations omitted). See
also Festa v. Greenberg, 354 Pa. Super. 346, 511 A.2d 1371 (1986), app. denied, 515 Pa. 580,
527 A.2d 541 (1987); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230, 523 P.2d 211 (1974), review denied,
84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974); Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (Penn-
sylvania law).
9. Spencer v. Seikel, 742 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Okla. 1987). The mother of a hydrocephalic
child born with virtually no brain claimed she should have been informed of the alternative of
abortion. The court found that the doctor had no duty to inform her that abortions at her
stage of pregnancy were legal in other states although not in Oklahoma; she knew about the
hydrocephalus and about the existence of abortion in general. Id.
10. Duff v. Yelin, 721 S.W.2d 365, 372 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (Even if plaintiff was not
informed of alternatives, the jury must find that "a person of ordinary prudence would have
refused the surgical procedure under the same or similar circumstances if the alternatives to
surgical treatment had been disclosed."), aff'd, 751 S.W.2d 175 (1988).
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ments (in addition to the alternative of no treatment) and to describe the
benefits and risks of those treatments. This duty does not require, of course,
that the physician describe every conceivable alternative to every detail of
the treatment he or she intends to provide. "Disclosure of alternative treat-
ment means disclosure of alternatives for the particular patient and not a
recital of medical casebook theory.""1 On the other hand, the "decision in-
volves choosing among medically acceptable options, not simply accepting
or rejecting the medically preferable option."12 Thus, this rule affects the
doctor-patient relationship even more profoundly than the duty to disclose
the risks of the recommended treatment, since it in effect obligates the physi-
cian to defend to the patient the choice of treatment in contrast to other
medically feasible treatments. The rule goes beyond ensuring that the pa-
tient understands the dangers of the treatment recommended and assumes a
role for the patient in the choice of treatment.
As mentioned above, the cause of action for lack of informed consent is
conceptually distinct from that for malpractice. The nature and extent of
compensable injuries differ as well. A patient may recover for a physician's
failure to disclose alternative treatments even if the chosen treatment is not
negligently performed. Thus, in Smith v. Karen S. Reisig, M.D., Inc.," 3 in
which the patient's bladder was punctured during a hysterectomy and in
which she had not been informed of the alternative of hormone therapy, the
court held:
In cases such as this, where liability is premised upon the physi-
cian's failure to inform of non-surgical alternatives, one of the ele-
ments of damage is the injury and expense caused by the surgery
itself, including any complications which may arise, whether re-
sulting from defective treatment or not, and without regard to
whether the complication was a risk to be disclosed. This is so
11. Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 946 (3d Cir. 1970).
12. APPELBAUM, LIDZ, & MEISEL, INFORMED CONSENT - LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 54 (1987). See also Archer v. Galbraith, 18 Wash. App. 369, 378-79, 567
P.2d 1155, 1161 (1977), review denied, 90 Wash. 2d 1010 (1978) ("While it may be that the
testimony as a whole indicated that the prudent course of action was to remove the nodule
surgically, this decision was not a decision to be made by the physician but by the patient. The
totality of the evidence permits an inference that had the patient been informed of the alterna-
tive treatment, though risky, a reasonably prudent patient would have chosen that course."
(citation omitted)); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242-43, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
513-14 (1972) ("In many instances, to the physician, whose training and experience enable a
self-satisfying evaluation, the particular treatment which should be undertaken may seem evi-
dent, but it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the
direction in which he believes his interests lie. To enable the patient to chart his course knowl-
edgeably, reasonable familiarity with the therapeutic alternatives and their hazards becomes
essential.").
13. 686 P.2d 285 (Okla. 1984).
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because the patient is required to establish that the surgery would
not have been performed if the alternatives had been disclosed.'
4
Indeed, it appears from the language of the court that even if the recom-
mended treatment were entirely "successful" (in that the results were as the
physician intended), the physician could still be liable for failure to disclose
an alternative treatment which by its nature might have caused less injury to
the patient. 15
On the other hand, the physician does not commit an actionable wrong
simply because he or she chooses between medically acceptable alterna-
tives. 16 The choice between alternative treatments will be evaluated under
the professional standard of malpractice. It is the failure to disclose the al-
ternative, not the failure to recommend it, which results in liability under an
informed consent theory.
Courts have struggled, and sometimes stumbled, in their attempts to spec-
ify the limits of the physician's duty to inform of alternative treatments. The
difficulty is, of course, much reduced if a professional standard of informed
consent is followed, since the jury will decide the issue by comparing the
testimony of competing medical experts. Whether other practitioners in the
relevant community would have disclosed the alternative is usually a fairly
direct yes-or-no question. Under the lay standard, however, the determina-
tion to be made by the jury is a more difficult one, since it involves a consid-
eration of what a reasonable person would want to know under the
circumstances. This decision requires analysis beyond simply weighing the
credibility of the opinions of opposing experts on community standards.
Furthermore, the court must instruct the jury as to what constitutes a medi-
cally acceptable alternative before the jury can decide whether a reasonable
patient would have wanted to know about it.
In attempting to define what constitutes an alternative treatment, courts
have attempted to impose various restrictions on the concept. Thus, in Lo-
gan v. Greenwich Hospital Association,1' the patient's gall bladder was punc-
tured during a needle biopsy of the kidney, and the patient complained that
the doctors had not mentioned the possibility of performing an open biopsy.
The trial court, in applying the lay standard of informed consent, instructed
14. Id. at 288-89.
15. For example, even a successful surgery might cause significant pain and leave a patient
physically impaired in some respect. If the therapeutic result could have been achieved by
another undisclosed method, the pain and impairment might be compensable injuries.
16. Young v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 571, 581 (D. Del. 1983) ("Where among physi-
cians and surgeons of ordinary skill and learning more than one method of treatment is recog-
nized as proper, it is not negligence for a physician or surgeon to adopt one such method
instead of another."); Harrigan v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 177, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
17. 191 Conn. 282, 465 A.2d 294 (1983).
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the jury that "[a]n alternative that is more hazardous is not a viable alterna-
tive." 8 In reversing the lower court, the appellate court held that this in-
struction "wholly relieves physicians of any obligation to discuss alternatives
with their patients and substitutes merely a duty to recommend the safest
procedure"' 9 and that all "viable" alternatives must be disclosed "even
though some involve more hazard than others."2 Although perhaps the
lower court's ruling might be correct if the alternative treatment were more
hazardous and provided no benefits different from those provided by the rec-
ommended treatment, this is rarely the case in reality. More often, compet-
ing treatments have different risk-benefit balances, and there is often
controversy within the medical profession about what the respective risks
and benefits are. Thus, a simple rule that "more hazardous" alternatives
need not be disclosed would not succeed in practice.
Courts have also struggled with the question of what constitutes an alter-
native treatment. For example, in Kalsbeck v. Westview Clinic, P.A.,21 the
decedent had pneumonia, and the issue was whether he should have been
hospitalized sooner and should have been subjected to more tests. The court
held:
The doctrine [of informed consent] applies when the patient must
choose between two or more medically accepted alternative meth-
ods of treatment.
The flaw underlying appellant's theory is that, rather than con-
stituting alternative methods of treatment, the choices available to
Kalsbeck were additional treatments. Had Dr. Haight disclosed
all of the potential risks confronting Kalsbeck, Kalsbeck might
have opted to be hospitalized. Perhaps he would have wanted Dr.
Haight to take a culture. He might have wanted to be given addi-
tional antibiotics. But Dr. Haight would still have administered
the treatment that he did give Kalsbeck, from the injection of Bicil-
lin, to the taking of the blood sugar, to the advice that he check
back with the doctor if there was no improvement in the next two
days. The doctrine of informed consent does not apply to situa-
tions where the patient's decision is whether to submit to treat-
ments in addition to the basic treatment given. Rather, it applies
only to situations where the choice is between two or more distinct,
alternative methods of treatment.2 2
18. Id. at 293, 465 A.2d at 301.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 295, 465 A.2d at 302. One doctor had testified that an open biopsy was "viable"
and that it did have some advantages. Id., 465 A.2d at 301.
21. 375 N.W.2d 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
22. Id. at 869.
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This holding ignores medical reality, and in effect immunizes from any duty
to give informed consent those physicians who recommend the most con-
servative treatment. The alternatives which should be revealed must include
alternative courses of treatment if the rule is to have any meaning. It cannot
make any difference that one of the courses of treatment is a lesser included
part of another course of treatment. This theory was implicitly recognized
in Keogan v. Holy Family Hospital,23 in which a doctor gave a 37-year-old
man with chest pain a "resting EKG" but did not inform him of a "treadmill
EKG" or of angiography. The court ruled that the doctor had a duty to
disclose alternative diagnostic procedures once he was aware of a physical
abnormality in the patient, and that the doctor was negligent as a matter of
law for his failure to disclose.24 Thus, alternate courses of treatment should
include alternate means of diagnosis and evaluation, as well as alternate
medical and surgical therapies.
Courts have also struggled with how different a treatment must be in or-
der to be considered an alternative. In Masquat v. Maguire,25 the plaintiff
claimed she was not informed of other methods of performing a sterilization
by tubal ligation that might be more easily reversed. The court held:
Ms. Masquat consented to the tubal ligation operation. Although
various methods were available to do the ligation the difference
between them was not so significant as to vitiate consent. The ap-
pellants' expert testimony showed that there was some difference in
successful reversals depending on which ligation method was used.
The testimony, however, did not demonstrate any causal linkage
between some unrevealed risk and the injuries complained of.
Therefore, the differences did not go to the nature of the operation
and a general consent to the surgery was sufficient.26
This decision appears to depart from the idea that the purpose of the in-
formed consent rule is to protect the patient's right to make informed deci-
sions about her medical treatment. Clearly, the different ligation methods
were all medically acceptable alternatives. Why should not the jury be per-
mitted to determine if a reasonable person would want to know about those
alternatives in making a decision about treatment? Similarly, in Wachter v.
23. 95 Wash. 2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246 (1980).
24. Id. at 314, 622 P.2d at 1252-53 (quoting Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d, 246, 251, 595
P.2d 919, 923 (1979)). But see Thornton v. Annest, 19 Wash. App. 174, 574 P.2d 1199 (1978)
(holding without explanation that a doctor is not required to disclose feasible alternative
means of diagnosis as opposed to treatment.). See also Wainess, Physician's Duty to Inform
Patients Who Refuse "Treatment," 32 MED. TR. T.Q. 444 (1986).
25. 638 P.2d 1105 (Okla. 1981).
26. Id. at 1107.
A Physician's Duty To Inform
United States,27 the doctor failed to inform the patient of the possible use of
the internal mammary artery for a coronary bypass operation instead of the
saphenous vein. The court held that the internal mammary artery (IMA)
procedure was not a "medically significant alternative," and further stated:
[T]he IMA procedure was not in general use, was not then known
among surgeons to produce better results, and was not the subject
of any definitive study showing it would be better than a saphenous
vein graft ... [T]his case presents only a choice of tactical surgical
approaches, rather than a choice among treatment modalities, and,
thus, it presents no issue of lack of informed consent.28
Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether the procedure was
sufficiently accepted to make it an alternative which must be revealed, there
is no obvious dividing line between a "tactical surgical approach" and a
"treatment modality." Indeed, if different tactical surgical approaches had
significantly different degrees or types of risk, would not a reasonable patient
wish to be informed of those differences? A standard of general applicability
is needed, rather than one which depends on mere semantics.
Thus, both the issue of whether "additional" treatment is alternative treat-
ment and whether an "insignificant" difference is an alternative treatment
should be treated in the same way. Any medically acceptable variation from
the recommended course of treatment, no matter how minor, should consti-
tute an alternative treatment. The crucial question should always be
whether a reasonable patient would deem the information about the alterna-
tive treatment material in deciding whether to undergo the recommended
treatment. Although there may be cases in which the difference is so insig-
nificant that a court should rule as a matter of law that the alternative need
not have been disclosed, the whole purpose of the lay standard is to vindicate
the patient's right to make an informed decision based on information he or
she would find material. It is for the jury to determine if any particular item
of information meets this standard. Possibly the courts in Kalsbeck, Mas-
quat and Wachter believed that no reasonable jury could have believed the
asserted alternatives to be material. If so, they should have explicitly based
their rulings on that ground, rather than obscuring the definition of alterna-
tive treatment.
There may be circumstances, of course, in which a physician will be re-
lieved of the obligation to disclose an alternative treatment. For example, if
the physician believes that disclosure will be harmful to the particular pa-
tient, most formulations of the rule permit silence.29 A similar question is
27. 689 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Md. 1988), aff'd, 877 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1989).
28. Id. at 1423-24.
29. 61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 191 (1981).
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whether a physician should be allowed to take into account the particular
patient's economic status in determining what alternative treatments to de-
scribe. Does it make sense, for example, to explain an expensive treatment
offered in an exclusive clinic in Vienna to an indigent patient from an Ameri-
can inner city? On the other hand, should doctors make the cost-benefit
analyses required in determining whether a patient can afford a treatment, or
should such decisions always be left to the patients themselves? a° Even these
questions, however, may be restated in terms of the general requirement to
disclose that information which a reasonable patient, under the circum-
stances of the patient in the particular case, would want to know.
IV. WHAT MAKES AN ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT "ACCEPTED"?
As can be seen from the case law described above, the essential criterion
for determining whether an alternative treatment must be disclosed is that
the treatment be "medically acceptable." The difficulty is in defining what
makes a particular treatment, especially a new one, acceptable, and to whom
it must be acceptable. In terms of a doctor's duty to disclose, this issue can
be broken down into two parts. First, what criteria, objective or subjective,
make a particular treatment acceptable? Second, are there additional factors
which create (or excuse) the particular physician's duty to know about the
treatment?31
Every new medical treatment, whether it be surgery, drug therapy, or an-
other more exotic technique, begins as an experimental treatment.32 Some
courts have held that there is no duty to offer patients treatments which are
still experimental. For example, in Del Valle Rivera v. United States,3 3 the
30. In the malpractice context, the failure to provide a new form of treatment solely be-
cause of its cost may be found to be negligent. For example, a plaintiff reportedly recovered
damages from District of Columbia General Hospital when the hospital did not provide a
CAT scanner for cost reasons. See Mehlman, Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical Treat-
ments, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 239, 287 (1985).
31. "[T]he courts must consider the process whereby medical discoveries are diffused.
Even after the therapeutic value of a new resource is demonstrated, its value may not be
known to practitioners." Id at 296 (footnote omitted).
32. "Another set of conditions that sometimes limits the availability of medical treatments
is the transition of a treatment from experimental to accepted status. After it is invented, a
new therapeutic or diagnostic tool or technique is refined, and its advantages and drawbacks
are communicated to and evaluated by the medical community. During this period, the availa-
bility of the resource is often sharply restricted, in part by law. Experimental new drugs and
medical devices, for example, are not widely available until they are approved for safety and
effectiveness by the Food and Drug Administration, a process which usually takes years. Fur-
thermore, federal health care reimbursement programs and private insurance plans do not
reimburse health care providers for experimental treatments, and this generally curtails their
availability." Id. at 242 (footnote omitted).
33. 630 F. Supp. 750 (D.P.R. 1986).
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court found no duty to offer "sclerotherapy," a treatment "being utilized on
an experimental basis in some stateside medical centers," because it was not
"an available developed therapy" at times material to the action.34 Such
cases do not go very far in solving the problem, however, since "experimen-
tal" is simply a label and must itself be defined. Furthermore, court rulings
that a physician did not commit malpractice by failing to apply an experi-
mental treatment35 do not necessarily answer the different question of
whether a doctor has a duty to inform his patients of the existence of the
experimental treatment.
Thus, either clear objective criteria or rational procedures are needed to
determine when, in the course of a new treatment's development, it becomes
sufficiently "acceptable" to create a duty of disclosure. There are several
"objective" criteria which could be used to evaluate the acceptability of new
treatments. They are only objective, however, in the sense that they depend
on the acceptance of the judgment of some entity outside the court.
For example, it could be argued that once a drug is approved by the Food
and Drug Administration for a particular indication, from the point that use
becomes an accepted treatment it must be revealed to patients for whom it
might be indicated. Of course, this rule would recognize the expertise of the
FDA as decisive in questions of medical judgment. Thus, it ignores the pos-
sibility that even though the FDA approves of a drug, a majority of experts
in the field might still believe that its acceptability was still unproven.
Should such opposition suffice to remove the duty to disclose? The FDA
might approve a new drug as "safe and effective" for use with a particular
condition, even though safer and more effective drugs were already available.
If no different benefits were provided by the new drug, it might not be con-
sidered "medically acceptable" for treatment of the condition as long as the
better drugs remained available. Another problem is that some drug treat-
ments become generally accepted even before the FDA approves the drug
for the particular use. This situation occurs most often when a drug ap-
proved for some uses is found to be effective for other complaints as well.
The drug is commercially available and physicians may prescribe it even
though the drug company may not be permitted to market it for the new
use. 36 Thus, an "FDA approval" rule might still fail to cover all medically
34. Id. at 755-56.
35. Garrett v. United States, 667 F. Supp. 1147, 1162-63 (W.D. La. 1987) ("This court
will not find malpractice in the treating physician's failure to adopt a 'controversial' treatment
modality which is not commonly accepted in the medical profession .... This court would
violate the long-established standard of care for physicians if it held a doctor liable for failing
to use experimental and unproven treatment on one of his patients.").
36. An example is the wide use of propranolol for angina pectoris, despite the absence of
FDA approval for that use. R. MERRILL & P. HuTr, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 462 (1980).
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acceptable drug treatments, and might presumptively categorize some treat-
ments as acceptable despite overwhelming disagreement by the medical
profession.3 7
A second possible source of acceptance of a new medical treatment is offi-
cial acceptance by a professional medical organization, such as the American
Medical Association or a medical specialty association.38 Like the "FDA
approval" rule, this rule would permit courts to defer to the professional
organization's expertise without the necessity of examining the reasonable-
ness of its conclusions. Since these organizations do not have governmental
status, accepting their approval as decisive would be merely to accept major-
ity rule of the profession as decisive. Such an approach would place the
interest of patients in conflict with the professional organization's interest in
protecting the members of the profession. It would also exclude treatments
supported by groups dissenting from the association's view, and would in-
volve association politics in the establishment of a legal standard.
Another possible objective criterion is recognition of the treatment as ac-
cepted in the most recent leading textbooks of the relevant specialty. There
are several problems with this approach. First, expert opinion testimony
would be required to establish which textbooks are the leading ones, and
thus acceptance of the treatment would simply be based on the opinions of
the textbook's authors. Second, it is impossible to keep textbooks up to date.
No major, general textbook is updated on more than a yearly basis, and
many specialty textbooks are updated even less frequently.39 A year is much
too long in today's rapidly changing realm of medical science. Finally, text-
books are likely to discuss only established, accepted treatments. Therefore,
the failure to mention an alternative does not indicate whether it is explicitly
disapproved or simply too new to have been included in the latest edition.
A similar rule would be to require that the acceptance of the new treat-
ment be demonstrated through articles in medical journals.' The leading
37. Other governmental entities may also issue statements as to appropriate medical treat-
ments. See, e.g., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, 1985 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES TREATMENT GUIDELINES (1985).
38. For example, the American Medical Association Division of Drugs and Technology,
in conjunction with the American Society for Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics, pub-
lishes drug evaluations with the purpose being "[t]o provide physicians and other health care
professionals with up-to-date, unbiased information on the clinical use of drugs." DIVISION OF
DRUGS AND TECHNOLOGY, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DEPARTMENT OF DRUGS,
DRUG EVALUATIONS iii (6th ed. 1986).
39. For example, an interval of four years occurred between revisions of CANCER: PRIN-
CIPLES & PRACTICE OF ONCOLOGY (V. Devita, Jr., S. Hellman & S. Rosenberg eds. 1989)
[hereinafter cited as CANCER], the leading oncology textbook.
40. This approach was at least implicitly accepted in Wachter v. United States, 689 F.
Supp. 1420 (D. Md. 1988), aff'd, .877 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1989).
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peer-reviewed journals are the primary fora for the discussion and dissemi-
nation of medical advances throughout the medical profession. As with
textbooks, however, expert testimony will still be needed to establish which
journal articles are conclusive and to interpret their findings.4"
Another possible consideration is whether the treatment is accepted for
reimbursement by insurance carriers. Insurance policies usually limit reim-
bursement to medical treatment which is "reasonable and necessary" for
treatment of the disease or "in accordance with generally accepted profes-
sional medical standards."42 However, it seems that while this might be a
relevant consideration for a patient in deciding whether to undergo the treat-
ment, it is not necessarily good evidence of whether the treatment is an ap-
propriate medical treatment. Indeed, insurance carriers may refuse to
reimburse certain new treatments because of their enormous cost, even
though they might be effective. There is little reason to leave the authority
to accept new medical treatments in the hands of those with an economic
incentive to withhold acceptance.43
The possible criteria described above attempt to define a treatment as "ac-
ceptable" by looking at external indicia such as support in the medical litera-
ture or approval by some decisionmaker with conclusive power. Another
possible criterion would be that the treatment in question must be "ac-
cepted" (as opposed to "acceptable") as an appropriate treatment by some
substantial percentage of practitioners in the relevant specialty. 44 Although
some of the other criteria mentioned above (especially professional organiza-
tion approval) would be useful or perhaps even presumptively decisive in
establishing this criterion, expert opinion would be necessary, particularly if
41. Of course, reliance on literature or other professional reports is not alone sufficient to
protect a physician from patient claims. For example, in Ahem v. Veterans Administration,
537 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1976) (New Mexico law), a patient with rectal cancer was exposed to
extremely high doses of radiation, on the basis of one paper read at a conference suggesting
high radiation treatments for bladder cancer. The court held that the treatment was experi-
mental, and that informed consent was not obtained: "[Iln order for a physician to avoid
liability by engaging in drastic or experimental treatment, which exceeds the bounds of estab-
lished medical standards, his patient must always be fully informed of the experimental nature
of the treatment and of the foreseeable consequences of that treatment." Id. at 1102.
42. Monaco and Burke, Insurance as Gatekeeper - Part Two: Policy Obstacles in Unproven
Methods Litigation, 20 FORUM 400, 404 (1985).
43. Monaco and Burke argue that insurance companies, "as part of their quasi-public
nature" have a responsibility to act as "gatekeepers" to exclude illegitimate claims, and that
they should carefully define their exclusions, including naming "the professional groups whose
opinions will be held definitive." Id. at 404, 416. One may well question whether this "quasi-
public" role is really compatible with an insurance company's profit motive.
44. One court has held that a patient has the right to be informed about an alternative
"means of therapy pursued by a respectable segment of the medical profession." Archer v.
Galbraith, 18 Wash. App. 369, 378, 567 P.2d 1155, 1161 (1977).
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the substantial percentage required were to be something less than a major-
ity. How sizable or respectable must the minority accepting the treatment
be before other practitioners are obligated to disclose it? What if the doctor
in question believes in good faith that the doctors who accept the treatment
are quacks?45 On the other hand, it is easy to imagine opposed schools of
thought as to a particular treatment which might nonetheless recognize the
intellectual respectability of the opposing school. For example, controversy
exists as to whether, in treating breast cancer in its early stages, "breast pres-
ervation utilizing local excision and radiation therapy" is preferable to a rad-
ical mastectomy.46 In such cases, it appears quite clear that a patient should
be informed that reasonable minds disagree as to the proper treatment for
the disease; indeed, it is probably the most important situation calling for
such information.47
The problems inherent in all the possible criteria are intensified when the
issue of the doctor's duty to know of a particular accepted treatment is ad-
ded into the calculation. For example, individual doctors cannot be ex-
pected to follow closely the actions of the FDA in approving all new drugs.
On the other hand, drug companies can be expected to act expeditiously in
informing doctors of the availability of their new drugs. Physicians may
have a duty to pay careful attention to such communications. Similarly, if
textbooks and journals are to establish the acceptance of a new treatment, it
must be recognized that there is a tremendous amount of such material
available. If a doctor is to be held responsible for keeping up with "the
literature," what journals and textbooks is he or she obligated to read? The
problem is the same if the criterion is acceptance by a substantial percentage
of practitioners. The individual practitioner must somehow learn of the
treatment and its level of acceptance. Furthermore, what if a physician is
aware of a new treatment for some particular reason different from those
listed above? For example, a doctor affiliated with a hospital might be aware
45. Consider, for example, the scientific dispute over the use of laetrile in the treatment of
cancer. J. PATTERSON, THE DREAD DISEASE: CANCER AND MODERN AMERICAN CULTURE
277 (1987); J. Henney, Unproven Methods of Cancer Treatment, in CANCER: PRINCIPLES &
PRACTICE OF ONCOLOGY 2338 (V. DeVita, Jr., S. Hellman & S. Rosenberg eds. 1985). Note
also that some states, including New York, recognize by statute that certain non-traditional
therapies are in some sense valid, for example, chiropractic therapy. N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§§ 6550-6556 (McKinney 1985). Must medical doctors inform patients of the chiropractic
alternative even if they believe it is invalid?
46. See CANCER, supra note 39, at 1229-30. "From the available data, it seems clear that
both mastectomy and breast preservation utilizing local excision and radiation therapy are
acceptable alternatives for the treatment of early breast cancer." Id. at 1230.
47. Id. "Today, both alternatives must be discussed with the patient; only through this
discussion can an informed patient receive information and guidance sufficient to permit her to
reach a reasonable decision." Id.
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that a new cancer treatment was being tested there. It is conceivable that
although the doctor might not have a duty to know about a new treatment,
he or she might have an obligation to inform patients of it anyway if he or
she in fact knows about it.
As mentioned previously, if a professional standard of informed consent is
employed, the problems described above will rarely arise, and the entire doc-
tor-patient interaction will be judged by the same standard of behavior.
Such an approach does not, however, grant the same importance to the pa-
tient's right to self-determination as does the lay standard.
V. CONCLUSION
The discussion above suggests that even if a "lay" approach to informed
consent is utilized, it cannot be effectively extended to determine what alter-
native treatments are medically acceptable, although it may be used to re-
quire medically acceptable treatments to be revealed. Application of a "lay"
approach to permit a jury to determine whether a reasonable patient would
have considered the treatment to be medically acceptable would mean that a
physician would never know what alternatives he or she might have to de-
scribe, and might lead to the description of even "quack" treatments for fear
that a future jury might find that a reasonable patient would have wanted to
know about those treatments. This danger is real, especially in those situa-
tions in which there is a committed, if eccentric, minority of physicians be-
lieving in the efficacy of the controversial treatment. Furthermore, a
practitioner might feel obligated to waste time scouring even the most ob-
scure literature for fear of missing a report of an "accepted" new treatment.
Many of these same dangers exist if any of the "objective" criteria used
above are applied as decisive factors, particularly when the problem of com-
munication is added. Even the "substantial percentage of practitioners" test
holds this threat if a jury is permitted to decide what percentage is
substantial.
Instead, the standard for medical acceptability should be based on the
perception of the reasonable practitioner. It would not necessarily be
whether a reasonable practitioner would inform a patient of the alternative,
but whether the reasonable practitioner would believe that the treatment was
a "medically acceptable" alternative, that is, whether it was accepted as an
appropriate treatment by a significant number of reputable experts in the
field. All of the factors described above - FDA approval, discussions in the
literature, the availability of information about the treatment, good-faith be-
lief the treatment was quackery, individual knowledge of a new treatment -
could potentially be used by experts in forming their opinions as to whether
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the practitioner was reasonable in his or her evaluation of whether or not the
treatment was medically acceptable. Some courts have implicitly recognized
this approach, requiring expert testimony to establish viable alternative
treatments and their accompanying risks, even in jurisdictions applying the
lay standard of informed consent. Thus, in Stelle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co.,48 a doctor performed a hysterectomy without informing the
patient of the possibility of more conservative treatment. The court held:
In order to show that the alternative procedure in this case was
"material" information, the patient would have to prove that it is
an accepted medical treatment. A physician, of course, would be
under no duty to disclose alternative procedures which were not
accepted as feasible. Hence, expert medical testimony was neces-
sary in this case to establish the feasibility of the procedure.4"
It should be emphasized that the standard is not whether the individual doc-
tor believes the treatment is feasible or advisable, but whether he or she is
aware that it is accepted by other experts in the field. It should be left to
expert testimony to explore the number and respectability of those accepting
the treatment, as well as the other factors which might contribute to the
analysis. Although the physician would still be in danger (as is probably
inevitable) from the opinions of unscrupulous or extremist experts, he or she
would be able to appeal to a professional standard for the evaluation of the
expert testimony. Under such a standard, a physician could avoid the dan-
ger of having to describe the theories of quacks or to explain treatments too
new to have a track record, but could still be held to have a duty to keep up
with the relevant literature and other sources of information, and to inform
patients of new treatments as they met the criteria of acceptance.
48. 371 So.2d 843 (La. App. 1979), cert. denied, 374 So.2d 658 (La. 1979).
49. Id. at 849 (citation omitted). See also Neal v. Lu, 365 Pa. Super. 464, 480-81, 530
A.2d 103, 112 (1987); Sard v. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 451, 379 A.2d 1014, 1025 (1977) (doctors
performed tubal ligation without describing alternate methods of ligation and other forms of
sterilization including vasectomy; expert testimony was not required to prove standard of in-
formed consent but was necessary to prove risks and alternatives); Adams v. Richland Clinic,
Inc., 37 Wash. App. 650, 681 P.2d 1305 (1984); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522
P.2d 852, 861 (1974) (Expert testimony is necessary to establish that an alternative treatment
is "feasible" but not to establish whether it must be disclosed: "There is no need to prove what
other doctors might tell their patients in similar circumstances."), aff'd, 85 Wash. 2d 151, 530
P.2d 334 (1975); Getchell v. Mansfield, 260 Or. 174, 489 P.2d 953 (1971).
